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Populism, Social Media and the COVID-19 Pandemic
This chapter aims to analyse the communicative performances of Italian political leaders on Facebook 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, a definition of populism is required, and social network 
sites must be understood as part of a hybrid media system. Following these definitions, COVID-19’s 
impact on Italy will be discussed.
 Populism is a contested concept that divides academics and causes massive debates.2 There are 
three main approaches to studying the phenomenon: as an ideology,3 as a political strategy4 or as a 
political communication style. This article will adopt the latter definition of populism, describing it as 
a “master frame” that politicians can use to discuss every political issue.5 Populists exhibit closeness 
to the people and adopt political discourses that feature three main elements: an appeal to the people, 
an attack against the elites and the ostracization of a social or political minority. The first element 
is necessary but not sufficient to describe an actor as populist. The other elements can be combined, 
generating different varieties of populism: excluding populism (only discriminating a social minority), 
anti-elitist populism (criticizing the elites), empty populism and complete populism (respectively char-
acterized by only referring to the people or by adopting all the elements). The main advantage of this 
definition is that it guarantees the strong operationalization of the concept.
 Even if the definition of populism is itself conflictual, the individuation of its causes is generally less 
controversial. Most academics claim that populism emerges only in the presence of several structural 
conditions that allow political leaders to intervene with their agency. Another general claim is that the 
media plays a role in populism’s growth, but only as an intervenient variable which cannot be substi-
tuted by structural ones.6 Among these structural factors, crises are the most studied. Many authors 
argue that neoliberal ideology is undergoing a crisis, leading to a diffusion of populism.7 Others focus 
1 This paper has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under 
grant agreement No 822590. Any dissemination of results here presented reflects only the author’s (or the authors’) 
view. The Agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. 
2 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A very short introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
2017).
3 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 541–563; Ben Stanley, “The thin 
ideology of populism,” Journal of political ideologies 13, no. 1 (2008): 95–110.
4 Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics,” Comparative Politics 
34, no. 1 (2001): 1–22.
5 Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave, “Populism as political communication style,” European Journal of Political 
Research 46, no. 3 (2007): 319–345.
6 Gianpetro Mazzoleni, “Populism and the media,” in Twenty-first century Populism. The Spectre of Western European 
Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 49–64.
7 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005); Paolo Gerbaudo, “Social media and populism: an elective 
affinity?” Media, Culture & Society 40, no. 5 (2018): 745–753.
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more on political representation crises8 or economic depression as triggers of populist movements.9 
However, these scholars use different definitions of “crises”; therefore, the link between populism and 
crisis must be examined more closely.10 Moreover, as discussed later, COVID-19 represents a peculiar 
crisis in many respects. 
 A growing number of studies focus on the relationship between populism and social media since 
their interactivity allows populists to strengthen the link between them and their audiences.11 A pio-
neering study has shown that, on social media, populists tend to fragment populist discourse, rarely 
resorting to “complete populism”, preferring to rely on one of the three elements.12 In the Italian con-
text, populist elements guarantee better performances on Facebook,13 and populist discourse has gone 
mainstream, being adopted even by mainstream leaders,14 according to populist zeitgeist theory.15 
Theoretically, there is an elective affinity between populism and social network sites: Social media is 
a powerful tool for populist leaders, using it to unite and persuade a multitude of atomized individuals 
who are disappointed and disillusioned by the hegemony of neoliberal ideology.16 
 Social network sites (SNS) must be understood as a fraction of the hybrid media system now char-
acterizing Western democracies.17 This system is the result of a process through which traditional 
media logic18 – characteristic of the second phase of political communication – becomes just one of 
the different logics at play in the political communication arena. First, as the mediatization of poli-
tics advance, traditional media logic, driven by commercial values and entertainment purposes, must 
confront itself with political logic.19 Second, mass self-communication technologies have emerged,20 
8 Giuliano Bobba and Duncan McDonnell, “Italy: a strong and enduring market for populism,” in European Populism 
in the Shadow of the Great Recession, ed. Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2015), 
163–179; Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The hollowing of Western democracy (London: Verso Trade, 2013), 17–20. 
9 Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas (eds.), European populism in the shadow of the great recession (Colchester: ECPR 
Press, 2015).
10 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Bobba and Hubé 
forthcoming.
11 Jamie Bartlett, “Populism, social media and democratic strain,” in European populism and winning the immigration 
debate, ed. Clara Sandelind (Stockholm: FORES, 2014), 99–114.
12 Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser and Florin Büchel, “Populism and social media: How politicians spread a 
fragmented ideology,” Information, communication & society 20, no. 8 (2017): 1109–1126.
13 Giuliano Bobba and Franca Roncarolo, “The likeability of populism on social media in the 2018 Italian general elec-
tion,” Italian Political Science 13, no 1 (2018): 51–62; Giuliano Bobba, “Social media populism: Features and ‘like-
ability’ of Lega Nord communication on Facebook,” European Political Science 18, no. 1 (2019): 11–23.
14 Gianpetro Mazzoleni and Roberta Bracciale, “Socially mediated populism: the communicative strategies of political 
leaders on Facebook,” Palgrave Communications 4, no. 1 (2018): 1–10.
15 Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist.”
16 Paolo Gerbaudo, “Social media and populism: an elective affinity?” Media, Culture & Society 40, no. 5 (2018): 745–
753.
17 Andrew Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
18 David L. Altheide, “Media logic,” The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication, ed. Gianpetro Mazzo-
leni, Kevin G. Barnhurst, Ken’ichi Ikeda, Rousiley C. M. Maia, and Hartmut Wessler (Chichester, Malden: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2015), 1–6.
19 Gianpetro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz, “‘Mediatization’” of politics: A challenge for democracy?” Political Com-
munication 16, no. 3 (1999): 247–261; Jesper Strömbäck, “Four phases of mediatization: An analysis of the mediatiza-
tion of politics,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 3 (2008): 228–246.
20 Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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ushering in a third era of political communication.21 SNS are characterized by a rationality that is 
effectively labelled as network logic.22 The differences between media and network logic could be bet-
ter illustrated in terms of three analytical dimensions. Traditional media production, based on profes-
sional journalistic structures, is driven by news values and economic interests. Theoretically, network 
logic allows users to become prosumers,23 committed to produsage activities.24 Consequently, content 
production is less directed by news values and depends more on personal interests, even if platform 
structures still represents content constraints25. 
 Media distribution was mainly based on media companies acting as gatekeepers, deciding which 
fact to transform into news; distribution on a social network is instead based on technological infra-
structures that allow spreadable content26 to flow through homophilic networks,27 where each user is 
an intermediary rather than a gatekeeper. Media use was characterized by a mass audience, mass con-
sumers and limited selective exposure. On social media, users are less influenced by spatial distances. 
Network logic makes it easier to distribute the same information to homophilic groups consisting of 
geographically distant individuals, strengthening the role of confirmation bias28 and often leading to 
echo chambers.29 Inside network logic, social and technological forces are intertwined and impossible 
to disentangle. Network, political and media logics – in its social and technological dimension – must 
be intended as ideal types, convenient when it comes to simplifying the complex flux of relationships 
occurring between politicians, media and citizens. It is precisely the interactions between these logics 
that constitute the hybrid media system. 
 This chapter studies Italian politicians’ Facebook performances during a period heavily influenced 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. The first case in Italy was recorded on 30 January 2020. The pandemic 
was considered a public security challenge only after a huge outbreak in Lombardy on 17 February. 
In the days that followed, several other outbreaks occurred, prompting a political reaction that led to 
a countrywide lockdown on 11 March. COVID-19’s impact on Italy at the time was drastic: It caused 
more than 33,000 deaths and more than 250,000 cases were recorded, creating a gigantic burden on 
the Italian health care system. For Italian politicians, COVID-19 was an issue too big and too salient to 
be ignored; therefore, Italian politicians adapted their communication strategy to the pandemic so as 
to exploit it, reaching consensus.
 In light of the literature previously examined, this crisis should have been an opportunity mainly 
for populists. However, during the outbreak, the COVID-19 pandemic was a peculiar crisis since it 
was primarily related to medical science and thus was managed by doctors and experts. To exploit the 
21 Jay. G. Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh, “The third age of political communication: Influences and features,” Political 
Communication 16, no. 3 (1999): 209–230.
22 Ulrike Klinger and Jakob Svensson, “The emergence of network media logic in political communication: A theoretical 
approach,” New Media & Society 17, no. 8 (2015): 1241–1257.
23 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Bantam Books, 1980).
24 Axel Bruns, Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From production to Produsage (Vol. 45 of Digital Formations, 
New York: Peter Lang, 2008).
25 As an emblematic example, one can think of the difference between a tweet and a Tik Tok video. 
26 Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green, Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture 
(New York: NYU Press, 2018).
27 Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin and James M. Cook, “Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks,” Annual 
review of sociology 27, no. 1 (2001): 415–444.
28 Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises,” Review of General Psychology 
2, no. 2 (1998): 175–220.
29 Walter Quattrociocchi, Antonio Scala, and Cass R. Sunstein, “Echo chambers on Facebook,” SSRN Electronic Jour-
nal, 2016, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795110.
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COVID-19 pandemic, populists had to politicize it, transforming a social crisis into a political issue30. 
Therefore, this chapter postulates that, when facing the pandemic, Italian politicians adopted differ-
ent strategies. Populists tried to politicize the crisis, whereas mainstream leaders tried to keep the 
pandemic issue depoliticized. This politicization of COVID-19 required time but was almost unavoid-
able after the adoption of the national lockdown when the pandemic’s frame inevitably shifted from 
a health dimension to an economic one. At the national level, Italian politicians fought to determine 
the entity and the economic beneficiaries. At the European level, every nation participated in the dis-
cussion regarding financial aid and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). For their part in the 
debate, Italian populists criticized the ESM, while mainstream leaders supported it. As figure 1 shows, 
the dispute had arisen in March, when the lockdown was already adopted. The apex of this process 
was reached on 10 April 2020 when news items on the ESM outnumbered even the COVID-19 related 
reporting.
Figure 1. Google Trends data for ESM31 mentions (in grey) and COVID-19 mentions (green) in 
Italian news
In light of these elements, the pandemic can be divided into two main phases. The first phase (21 
January to 11 March) began with the first huge outbreak in Lombardy and ended with the nationwide 
lockdown. The second phase (11 March to 10 April) began with the lockdown and ended when discus-
sions of the ESM reached their apex. In terms of this temporal division, two hypotheses are proposed:
 Hypothesis 1. In the first phase, the pandemic is not politicized as it presented itself as a health 
crisis; mainstream politicians will overperform in terms of likes, comments and shares.
 Hypothesis 2. In the second phase, the crisis is politicized since the public debate focuses on its eco-
nomic dimension; at this stage, populists will overperform in terms of likes, comments and shares.
30 Following Carl Schmitt’s The concept of the Political: Expanded Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 
an issue becomes politicized when it enters into the political sphere, that is, the battlefield of an intractable fight 
between two opposite factions which are impossible to unify. 
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Data and Methods 
The analyses in this chapter were conducted on a dataset containing all Facebook posts published by 
major Italian political leaders between the 18 January 2020 and 20 April 2020. The dataset is composed 
of 3,350 posts automatically downloaded through Crowdtangle. This data allows us to study Facebook 
performances before and after the pandemic’s main phases as defined in the preceding paragraph. 
 Six leaders are examined: Three are populists, and three are mainstream; three are in government, 
and three are in opposition. Considering populism as a political communication style, Italy has three main 
populist parties: the Northern League (LN; Lega Nord), led by Matteo Salvini; the Five Star Movement 
(M5S; Movimento 5 Stelle), previously led by Di Maio and, since 22 January 2020, led by Vito Crimi; and 
the Brothers of Italy (Fdl; Fratelli d’Italia), led by Giorgia Meloni. The Northern League has been studied 
as a populist party starting with its establishment in the 1990s,32 through its transition phase when – led 
by Salvini – it became a national rather than regionalist party,33 until the 2018 national election, when 
it formed a coalition government with M5S, with Giuseppe Conte as prime minister. However, due to a 
political crisis provoked by Salvini, this government ended in August 2019 when Conte was confirmed as 
prime minister of a second coalition government consisting of M5S, the Democratic Party (PD; Partito 
Democratico) and Italia Viva (IV; Italy alive). The second populist party M5S is one of the typical anti-
establishment movements that flourished in Europe after 2000.34 M5S declares itself as post-ideological 
and developed Rousseau, a website conceived as an online direct democracy tool.35 During the COVID-
19 pandemic, M5S was the only populist party in government. Fdl is a far-right party having recently 
recorded huge growth in terms of shares, and Meloni has recently been studied as an example of a female 
populist leader.36 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data shows political and ideological similarities between Fdl 
and the Northern League since strong anti-elitist traits characterize both parties.37 Moreover, Meloni 
skilfully exploited social media and memes to open a dialogue with the broader public using an unconven-
tional media format. For example, in 2019, Meloni’s political speech was remixed, becoming a trending 
video in Italy with more than ten million views on YouTube. 
 Italy’s mainstream parties include Forza Italia (FI; Go Italy), PD and IV. Berlusconi is FI’s founder, 
and he has been studied as a clear example of populism.38 However, the same survey quoted above 
reveals that his communication can no longer be considered populist in respect to the anti-elitism and 
anti-establishment traits adopted. Moreover, in the 2018 elections, Berlusconi overtly depicted him-
self as the only alternative to populists.39 PD, led by Zingaretti, is the biggest left-wing party even after 
32 Lorella Cedroni, “Lega Nord” in I Partiti Italiani. Iscritti, Dirigenti, Eletti, ed. Luciano Bardi, Pietro Ignazi and Oreste 
Massari (Milano: Università Bocconi Editore, 2007), 247–268.
33 Danielle Albertazzi, Arianna Giovannini and Antonella Seddone, “‘No regionalism please, we are Leghisti!’ The trans-
formation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini,” Regional & Federal Studies 28, no. 5 
(2018): 645–671.
34 Lorenzo Mosca and Filippo Tronconi, “Beyond left and right: the eclectic populism of the Five Star Movement,” West 
European Politics 42, no. 6 (2019): 1258–1283.
35 Roberto D’Alimonte, “How the populists won in Italy,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 114–127.
36 Donatella Campus, “Female Populist Leaders and Communication: Does Gender Make a Difference?” Perspectives on 
Populism and the Media: Avenues for Research 7 (2020): 235–252.
37 Ryan Bakker, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada 
Anna Vachudova, “2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey,” Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2019, available at 
https://www.chesdata.eu/2019-chapel-hill-expert-survey.
38 Andrej Zaslove, “Here to stay? Populism as a new party type,” European Review 16, no. 3 (2008): 319–336.
39 Franca Roncarolo and Cristina Cremonesi, “Journalistic Narratives and Political Communication Strategies Against 
the Background of a Critical Mood: The 2018 Election Campaign in the Traditional Media and Beyond,” in The Italian 
General Election of 2018, ed. Luigi Ceccarini and James L. Newell (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 191–215.
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a split the saw Matteo Renzi – the former prime minister – found IV, a centrist and personal party. 
Together with M5S, PD and IV have been in government throughout the COVID-19 crisis (as of this 
writing). This government is led by Giuseppe Conte, whose Facebook account will be analysed at the 
end of the next paragraph. 
 Regarding the dataset, some specifications are necessary. First, even if Di Maio is no longer M5S’s 
leader, we preferred to analyse his account rather than Crimi’s. This choice is primarily motivated by 
the institutional and media relevance which Di Maio, unlike Crimi, has in the Italian political land-
scape. Moreover, the management of Crimi’s account is less professionalized, and, above all, it pub-
lishes a small number of posts, making statistical analysis fragile. Additionally, this dataset has two 
main disadvantages. Firstly, Facebook users are not a representative sample of the Italian population, 
and this prevents generalizing the results of this article. Secondly, in the first paragraph, SNS were dis-
cussed and defined in the context of a hybrid media system; using only Facebook data, the theoretical 
standpoint of the analysis is betrayed. We used other data sources to compensate for this shortcoming: 
In the preceding paragraph, Google Trends was used to establish the apex of ESM-related news; and in 
the conclusion, private survey data will be used for some considerations. The statistical analysis uses 
the number of likes (and reactions), comments and shares obtained by each leader on their Facebook 
posts as dependent variables. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics about the performances of 
these pages.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of leaders’ performances (in terms of likes and reactions)
Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Media Min Max
Di Maio 382 14,623 2,489 145,790
Salvini 1,505 16,045 1,591 131,283
Meloni 630 14,172 1,050 198,077
Renzi 231 5,361 0 48,418
Zingaretti 388 1,024 0 38,284
Berlusconi 241 1,733 433 53,837
N 3,350
The leaders’ accounts are very different in terms of fanbases and number of posts published during the 
designed period. Thus, their average post garners different success as regards likes, comments and 
shares. To ensure the comparability of every item in the dataset, it is therefore necessary to standard-
ize the three dependent variables, as shown in figure 2, for the variable generated from the sum of likes 
and reactions. 
Figure 2. Standardization formula applied to the first dependent variables
Moreover, as figure 3 shows, the frequency distribution of these three variables is not linear since 
a great number of posts obtained few likes, comments and reactions, whereas just a small number 
obtained great success. 
Likes + Reactions – mean (Likes + Reactions)
sd(Likes + Reactions)
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These frequency distributions and the hypothesis declared in the first paragraph determined the choice 
of statistical model used in this article. We decided to use LOWESS curves, an acronym that stands 
for locally weighted scatterplot smoothing. This technique produces a linear regression for each value 
recorded by each dependent variable. It then uses the regression lines identified in that way to produce 
the curve that best fits the trend of their values. The advantage of this tool is that the regression result 
is less influenced by outliers. The main disadvantage is that the extremes of the curves are not totally 
reliable; each point of the LOWESS curve is affected by the position of the adjacent points, and this 
implies that its initial and final segments are drawn upon weaker analysis. This technique will be used 
to perform three statistical models – one for each dependent variable – that will describe the chrono-
logical evolution of Facebook performances. Finally, another regression analysis will be presented to 
evaluate the statistical significance of the difference in performances obtained by each leader before 
and after the outbreak of the pandemic. This last model will be based on a linear regression because 
the analysis will be applied to the already standardized variables. All these procedures will be first 
applied to the parties’ leaders, comparing populists and mainstream performances. Lastly, they will 
be applied to Conte’s account. 
Findings
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the results of the LOWESS curves produced for each dependent variable. The 
axes represent the publication date of every Facebook post and its standardized score measured by the 
three variables. Since they were standardized, all the leaders’ curves are comparable.
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The first dependent variable measures the sum of likes and reactions obtained by each post in the 
dataset. From the LOWESS curves, a trend compatible with the research hypotheses emerges. 
Before 21 February, that is, before the outbreak of the pandemic, all Italian politicians’ performances 
were below their average values. However, this is not a particularly pronounced trend, especially for 
mainstream leaders, who are very close to their “normal” performances. A partial exception is that 
recorded by Salvini, who consistently underperforms. However, his lowest scores occur in the initial 
days. As explained in the previous paragraph, this can be due to the statistical tool used. In the first 
phase, all the politicians improve their performances. However, the populist leaders’ performances 
only weakly increase, and, among them, Salvini is the only one to overperform, obtaining more likes 
and reactions than the average. The increase is more substantial for mainstream leaders, who all 
overperform. Therefore, in the first phase, mainstream leaders overperform, while populists obtained 
weaker results, underperforming. 
 During the second phase, mainstream leaders’ performances instead deteriorate and return 
closer to their average values. Conversely, populists considerably overperform, reaching an average 
number of likes and reactions almost in excess of one standard deviation of their average values. 
The peak of these performances tends to coincide with the apex of the ESM discussion that occurred 
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Figure 5. Mainstream and populist performances (comments)
The LOWESS curves describing the comments obtained by each Facebook post (figure 5) show a simi-
lar, although less pronounced trend. In the first phase, Matteo Salvini is the only populist who over-
performs. During this phase, all mainstream leaders overperform, albeit not in an accentuated way in 
terms of standard deviations. In the second phase, instead, their performances drop, while those of the 
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Figure 6. Mainstream and populist performances (shares)
The final LOWESS curves show a similar trend in shares. In the first phase, mainstream leaders 
slightly overperform, whereas the populist leaders’ performances are below their average score. Dur-
ing the second phase, Berlusconi, Renzi and Zingaretti’s performances do not substantially differ from 
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 The LOWESS curves can only describe the chronological evolutions of leader performances and, 
therefore, fail to assess whether the differences between the average post published by each leader before 
and after the pandemic is statistically significant. To ensure a more robust analysis, we carried out a 
linear regression for each dependent variable. The results are shown in figure 6, where the confidence 
interval is set at 95%. As described in the preceding section, the populists’ performances improve after 
11 March; the chart shows that all those differences are statistically significant, except for the difference 
in Meloni’s performances measured by the comment variable. On the other side, mainstream leaders reg-
istered a lower increase in their performances, and those differences are never statistically significant. 
This result is particularly important because it partially prevents the analysis from adopting spurious 
relations: The variable that seems to be the most important to explain the variation in the dependent 
variables is the dichotomous populist/mainstream variable and not the variable in power / in opposition. 
Figure 7. Statistical significance tests (likes and reactions) 
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Figure 9. Statistical significance tests (shares)
Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte does not follow the trends described in the previous sections. This is 
mainly due to the institutional role, which guarantees him considerable visibility and media coverage. 
Also, during the pandemic, he repeatedly announced “in advance” the content of government meas-
ures on his Facebook profile, which immediately became one of the most followed in the nation.
Table 2. Account growth during the COVID-19 pandemic





 Δ Δ %
Conte 1,062,114 3,363 111,892 1,710,912 1,826,167 172% 
Meloni 1,319,908 21,662 22,582 134353 178,597 14% 
Salvini 4,020,473 36,791 13,033 114,624 164,448 4% 
Di Maio 2,206,005 -2,606 1,734 115,930 115,058 5%
Zingaretti 300,858 1,927 10,995 6,997 19,919 7%
Berlusconi 1,058,705 522 -1,061 11,380 10,841 1%
Renzi 1,152,179 3,467 2,502 4,646 10,615 1%
As table 2 shows, Conte’s fanbase increased by 172% during the pandemic. This means that it gained 
almost two million followers in four months. This incredible growth is unmatched among other Italian 
politicians and makes it difficult to compare the accounts. Despite the standardization of dependent 
variables, Conte’s page is anomalous, since during all pandemic phases, it improves its performance 
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Figure 10. Conte’s performance (likes and reactions, comments and shares)40
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Figure 11. Conte’s performance (shares)
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to shed light on the relationship between populism and social media 
in a peculiar period, characterized by COVID-19’s drastic impact on Italian society. At first, populism 
was defined as a communicative style appealing to the people, attacking the elite and ostracizing oth-
ers. Next, Facebook was studied as part of a complex hybrid media system built upon intricate inter-
actions occurring between media, political, social and technological forces. The relationship between 
these two phenomena was then deepened and examined, with Italy as the chosen case study and the 
months-long COVID-19 outbreak as the temporal setting. The pandemic was analytically divided into 
two phases. During the first phase, stretching from the detection of the first outbreak to the beginning 
of the lockdown, the pandemic issue progressively gained social and political attention, although it was 
framed primarily as a social crisis and, therefore, remained depoliticized. Here, mainstream political 
leaders overperformed in terms of likes, comments and shares obtained on their Facebook posts, while, 
conversely, populists slightly underperformed. These trends confirmed the first research hypothesis 
and were mainly linked to the social rather than political nature of the crisis. Another element that may 
contribute to explaining these results could be a “rally around the flag” effect.41 Indeed, survey data 
shows that in this period, citizens tended to be supportive of their government, positively evaluating its 
41 John E. Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” The American Political Science Review 64, no. 1 
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policies and criticizing politicians who overly created obstacles for Conte and his interventions during 
this critical period.42
 The second phase started with the lockdown and ended when the ESM discussion reached its quan-
titative apex on 10 April. Here mainstream leaders underperformed while populists largely overper-
formed in terms of likes, comments and shares. During this phase, the pandemic’s frame changed; 
it was labelled a political rather than social crisis. Here, every possible way of rallying around the 
flag vanished. Moreover, the differences measured by the three dependent variables before and after 
the pandemic are statistically significant only for populists. These results match the second research 
hypothesis. 
 Conte’s Facebook account is anomalous since it gained almost two million fans during the pan-
demic. This gigantic growth fosters his performances, which constantly improve in the period exam-
ined. The main reason why Conte’s fanbase increased to such a degree is that he regularly used his 
Facebook account to broadcast in advance of the most important policies. Rather than a reflection on 
the relationship between populism and crisis, Conte’s account is a fruitful field to reflect on the rela-
tionship between institutional visibility and private ownership of the channels with which it unfolds. 
During the pandemic, Conte gathered a large audience, thus accumulating a large amount of social 
capital and power through the growth of his private profile on Facebook. These resources will remain 
Conte’s property even after the termination of his institutional assignment.
42 “Ipsos Srl survey,” published on September 3, 2020, available at: http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/ListaSond-
aggi.aspx. 86% of the subjects interviewed approved the first policies adopted by the government to deal with the 
pandemic; 61% of the subjects interviewed criticize Salvini and Renzi, who are the politicians responsible for criticizing 
Conte the most in this period. Another survey (“Ipsos Srl Survey”, published on December 3, 2020; available at: http://
www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/ListaSondaggi.aspx) reveals that at the beginning of the lockdown, Italians seemed 
to be totally supportive of their government as long as it followed scientific experts, who were trusted by 64% of inter-
viewees. 
